I. INTRODUCTION
The National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA") is the first environmental charter of the United States. Signed into law on January 1, 1 1970, NEPA addresses the need for overarching national environmental guidance in the country. During the course of its forty year history, NEPA has been used to challenge a wide range of federal actions including the issuance of operating permits under the Clean Air Act, the approval of forest 2 management plans approved under the National Forest Management Act, the breadth of NEPA's applicability, it was inevitable that NEPA would become a tool to combat climate change. The use of NEPA to require federal agencies to take a "hard look" at greenhouse gas ("GHG") emissions makes perfect sense because many federal actions directly or indirectly contribute to GHG emissions. Since 1990, in City of Los Angeles v. NHTSA, plaintiffs have used 6 NEPA, successfully and unsuccessfully, to challenge federal actions that might have an impact on the global climate.
The attraction of using NEPA as a sword to combat climate change lies in the Act's holistic approach to review of federal actions. Unlike the Clean Air Act and other single medium statutes, NEPA applies to all federal actions 7 and agencies. NEPA's holistic application is an acknowledgment of the 8 interconnected relationship that is unique to the Earth. Indeed, you cannot understand the impact that a federally-approved logging road will have on an ecosystem unless you know something about soil erosion, water quality, air impacts, biodiversity, and species endangerment. Climate change is no less complex. Federal decisions related to oil exploration, transportation projects, coal-fired power plants, forest management, and others have an impact on climate. As noted ecologist Barry Commoner stated in his book, The Closing Circle, there is one ecosphere for all living organisms and what affects one, affects all. That is, "everything is connected to everything else." It is this 9 interconnectedness that NEPA requires to be examined.
This article explores and analyzes the various uses of NEPA as a statutory tool to combat climate change. The article begins by first providing an overview of the NEPA statutory requirements. Second, in order to provide a backdrop for the case law that has come out of NEPA's enforcement, the article provides a review of both climate change science and the regulatory actions conducted in response. Third, the case law related to NEPA climate change litigation is surveyed. Fourth, an analysis of that case law within the context of the NEPA regulations is conducted. Fifth, a review of the draft CEQ guidance on Assessing GHG Impacts from Proposed Federal Actions is assessed. Sixth, a proposed congressional response is appraised. Lastly, the impact on future litigation is considered.
II. THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT

Overview
NEPA has three main components: provisions articulating national environmental policies and goals, provisions that require federal agencies to 10 implement those policies and goals, and finally a section that establishes the 11 Council on Environmental Quality ("CEQ"). NEPA's policies and goals are 12 broad, general, and inspirational. NEPA requires federal agencies to give 13 environmental factors the same consideration as other factors in their decision making process. To ensure that such policies are obeyed, NEPA requires CEQ to ensure that Federal agencies meet their obligations under the Act.
While the requirements of NEPA are mandatory, they are largely procedural in nature and supplement existing legal requirements of federal agencies. The CEQ regulations require agencies to integrate NEPA 14 requirements from the beginning of the project planning process to ensure that the decision making process reflects environmental values, avoids delays, and reduces conflict. Moreover, these statutory and regulatory requirements are 15 interdisciplinary in approach and require the development of appropriate alternatives to recommended courses of actions. 16 The NEPA Process
The NEPA process begins when a federal agency develops a proposal for which it will take action, for example, a permit, license, or request of approval. Once the agency has developed a proposed action, it must then determine whether that action will be the subject of a Categorical Exclusion ("CE"), an Environmental Assessment ("EA"), or an Environmental Impact Statement ("EIS"). A proposed action is the subject of a CE if the agency concludes the action or actions do not either individually or cumulatively have a significant effect on the quality of the human environment. If the proposed 17 action does not qualify for a CE, the agency must prepare an EA or an EIS. 18 The EA helps determine the significance of the environmental impacts of the proposal and assesses alternative means of achieving the agency's objectives. The EA process ends with either a Finding of No Significant 19 Impact ("FONSI") or a requirement to prepare an EIS. 20 A federal agency must prepare an EIS if it is proposing a federal action that it determines will significantly affect the quality of the human environment. The EIS process starts with publication of a Notice of Intent 21 ("NOI") in the Federal Register. The purpose of the NOI is to announce the agency's intent to prepare an EIS for the proposal at issue while providing basic information about the proposal, in preparation for the scoping process. 22 The next major step in the EIS process is the release of the draft EIS for public comment. There are a number of key components in the draft EIS. The "Purpose and Need" statement explains why the agency action is necessary. 23 In this statement, the agency must identify and evaluate alternative ways of fulfilling the need of the proposed action. If an agency has a preferred 24 alternative at the time it publishes a draft EIS, the draft must identify that 25 When the public comment period is finished, the agency analyzes comments, conducts further analysis as necessary, and prepares the final EIS. 28 The agency then publishes the final EIS and the Environmental Protection Agency will publish a Notice of Availability in the Federal Register. The ROD, or Record of Decision, is the final step for agencies in the EIS process. The ROD is the written record of the agency's decision. It identifies the alternatives considered, including the environmentally preferred alternative, and discusses mitigation plans, including any enforcement and monitoring commitments.
29
A New Cause of Action
Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee, Inc. v. United States Atomic Energy Commission (Calvert Cliffs') is one of the most influential cases in 30 the area of environmental law, especially with regard to NEPA. Calvert Cliffs' originally arose as a challenge to a nuclear power plant that was slated for construction in Calvert Cliffs, Maryland. The plaintiff argued that the rules adopted by the federal Atomic Energy Commission did not satisfy the rigor demanded by NEPA because, unlike NEPA, the agency's rules did not require evaluation of the environmental impacts of proposed nuclear power plants. In response, the defendants argued that the vagueness of NEPA leaves room for agency discretion. Ultimately, the court sided with the plaintiff and held the Commission must revise its rules governing consideration of environmental issues.
Calvert Cliffs' represents the first time a federal court found NEPA to create a cause of action against federal agencies that do not comply with the Act's directives. The court held that federal agencies must consider 31 environmental issues just as they consider other matters within their [Vol requires action to avoid serious or irreversible potential harm, despite lack of scientific certainty as to the likelihood, magnitude, or causation of that harm. As applied to environmental policy, the precautionary principle requires that for significant changes to the environment such as deforestation or dams, the burden of proof lies with those who oppose the implementation of additional environmental protection measures to address a potential problem. The precautionary principle is explicitly recognized in American jurisprudence. 36 Consequently, those who would challenge the EPA's regulations must overcome not only Mead and Chevron, but also this fundamental principal. science, like any legitimate scientific undertaking, is an iterative process. It circles back on itself such that useful ideas are built upon and used to learn even more about a particular topic. This often means that successive investigations of a topic lead back to the same question, but on a more nuanced level. In the scientific process all ideas are tested with evidence from the natural world. Moreover, members of the scientific community play an important role in this process by "peer reviewing" the ideas and evidence on a particular topic.
This iterative process has been a hallmark of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change ("IPCC"). The IPCC is a scientific body reviews and assesses the most recent scientific, technical and socio-economic information produced worldwide relevant to the understanding of climate change. It does 48 not conduct any research nor does it monitor climate related data or parameters. Rather, its function is to review relevant information so as to ensure an objective and complete assessment of that information.
The Moreover, the fourth report stated: "there is very high confidence that the net effect of human activities since 1750 has been one of warming." Most of 54 the observed increase in global average temperatures since the mid-20th century is very likely due to the observed increase in anthropogenic GHG concentrations. In addition, the assessment noted that "continued GHG 55 emissions at or above current rates would cause further warming and induce many changes in the global climate system during the 21st century that would very likely be larger than those observed during the 20th century." 56 Some of those changes would include "warming greatest over land and at most high northern latitudes and least over Southern Ocean and parts of the North Atlantic Ocean," reduced snow cover area, and an increased frequency 57 of hot extremes, heat waves and heavy precipitation. The report noted that key vulnerabilities may be associated with many climate-sensitive systems, including food supply, infrastructure, health, water resources, coastal systems, ecosystems, global biogeochemical cycles, ice sheets and modes of oceanic and atmospheric circulation. As a result, the impacts of climate change are 58 very likely to impose net annual costs, which will increase over time as global temperatures increase.
59
EPA's Endangerment Finding
In response to findings such as those of the IPCC and to the Supreme Court's decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, the EPA issued a final rule perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and sulfur hexafluoride (SF ), in the atmosphere threaten the public health and welfare of current and future generations. Second, the EPA found that the combined emissions of these well-mixed greenhouse gases from new motor vehicles contribute to the greenhouse gas pollution, which threatens public health and welfare. The EPA reached these two conclusions based on the body of scientific evidence, which included work of the EPA, other federal agencies, universities, and international bodies, including the work of the IPCC, related to this issue. It found that the effects related to climate change include, but 62 are not limited to, more persistent and extreme heat waves, more intense wildfires, reduced agricultural yields, increased drought, more frequent downpours and flooding, damage to aquatic resources, and reduced diversity in wildlife and ecosystems. Additionally, the EPA found that the impacts on 63 public health include "reduced air quality, increases in temperatures, changes in extreme weather events, increases in food-and water-borne pathogens, and changes in aeroallergens." 64 Moreover, "certain groups, including children, the elderly, and the poor, are most vulnerable to these climate-related health effects." EPA concluded 65 that the evidence provides compelling support for finding that greenhouse gas air pollution endangers the public welfare of both current and future generations, and that the risk and the severity of adverse impacts on public welfare are expected to increase over time. 66 Underlying this finding and the regulations promulgated in its name is the "precautionary principle." As indicated earlier, this principal requires action 67 to avoid serious or irreversible potential harm, despite lack of scientific certainty as to the likelihood, magnitude, or causation of that harm. In the context of global climate change, this puts the burden of proof on those who oppose the implementation of additional environmental protection measures to address a potential problem.
The most significant component of the precautionary principle as applied to environmental litigation is its applicability to potentially irreversible actions, such as the effects associated with climate change. The Earth's climate is a large, complex non-linear dynamical system. As a result, the increase in temperature may be much greater and faster than estimated. This 68. Id. 69. See Mass., 594 U.S. 497, at 506 n.7 (citing Ethyl Corp., 541 F.2d at 6) (" [T] he Clean Air Act 'and common sense . . . demand regulatory action to prevent harm, even if the regulator is less than certain that harm is otherwise inevitable.'"). 
IV. CASE LAW UNDER NEPA RELATED TO CLIMATE CHANGE
Overview
Climate change litigation under NEPA rarely has just one plaintiff and one defendant, nor is the litigation typically about just one issue. Climate change may be just one of many issues that a plaintiff raises. As such, this litigation typically requires the examination of several statutes. It may also require the court to review multiple federal actions. Moreover, NEPA litigation often touches upon procedural issues such as standing to sue. Because there is a mix of procedural and substantive issues, these cases are very difficult to categorize. As a result, a meaningful analysis of these cases requires that each case be examined on its own merits. Only by looking at these cases in the aggregate do certain patterns emerge that provide for a roadmap for future litigants. This case is important to the litigation history of NEPA, not because of its ultimate finding, but rather because the court recognized that car emissions, a "new and potentially catastrophic environmental phenomenon" in global warming, "fit squarely into the broad NEPA framework." The case is also 80 noteworthy both because the court recognized that the petitioners had standing and how the court reached this conclusion. To establish standing in a case 81 alleging that an agency failed to follow NEPA, a plaintiff must show that the challenge fits within NEPA's zone of interest requirement. To do so, the court held that a litigant must show he was adversely affected or aggrieved by the failure to comport with NEPA's requirements and that the aggrieving action is covered by NEPA's congressional mandate.
82
In this case, NRDC met its burden. NRDC argued that the agency's failure to prepare an EIS created the risk that it would overlook global climate change effects that could come from lower fuel efficiency standards for MY 2 1989, especially the effects from increased CO . The court found that NRDC 83 had established that a serious environmental harm, global warming, was at stake. Next, the court noted that NRDC had proven that its members have a 84 sufficient geographical nexus to the location where the consequences are most likely to be felt. Without an EIS evaluating consequences of the CAFE 85 standards, the uncertainty of the real environmental impact will remain. Thus, the court recognized NRDC was aggrieved under NEPA and it thereby had standing.
86
NRDC's challenge met the zone of interest requirement under NEPA because its concerns about global warming fall under the broad congressional mandate of NEPA. The court found that while the environmental problems 87 associated with increases in global temperatures were complex, the resultant harms were real and undisputed enough to fall within the areas of specific congressional concern. As a result, the court held that NRDC was aggrieved 88 within the zone of interest to be protected. Finally, the court addressed whether NRDC must establish that the incremental impact of the emissions from the CAFE rollback has a significant effect on global warming for standing purposes to prove causation. Judge 90 Wald asserted that to meet the causal nexus standard, a petitioner only needs to show that the alleged injury is "fairly traceable" to the proposed action.
91
Since NRDC had presented evidence that further information might influence NHTSA's decision, the court held that it had established a causal nexus.
92
Although the NRDC overcame the hurdle of standing, ultimately NHTSA won the case. In writing for the majority of the court on the merits, Judge D.H. Ginsberg found that NHTSA did not prepare an EIS because it believed that the impact of its CAFE decision would not have a significant impact on the environment. The court agreed with NHTSA's decision not to prepare an plaintiffs asked the court to declare forty-two actions of the defendants unlawful. They argued that the defendants authorized, approved, or funded programs and actions that contributed to or ameliorated the greenhouse effect without discussing and evaluating the impacts of those contributions in environmental documentation, review, and decision-making. Therefore, the actions violated NEPA. The court held that the plaintiffs lack standing to 96 challenge the defendants' failure to comply with NEPA under either the informational injury or environmental injury approach. The court granted the 97 defendants' motion for summary judgment, and denied the plaintiffs' motion to amend their complaint. In its standing analysis, the court noted that litigants must meet both the constitutional requirements for standing and the requirements imposed by Congress in the APA to obtain judicial review of agency action under NEPA.
99
Under the Constitutional standing analysis, a plaintiff must allege that his personal injury is fairly traceable to the alleged unlawful conduct of the defendant and must show that his injury likely will be redressed by the relief requested. Additionally, where there is a challenge to a federal agency's 100 compliance with NEPA, the Plaintiffs' right to judicial review is governed by § 10(a) of the APA.
101
In an attempt to establish standing, the plaintiffs relied on the doctrine of informational standing. This doctrine stems from a footnote in other cases suggest that an organization may have informational standing when an organization asserts a plausible link between an agency's actions, the informational injury, and the organization's activities, and where the organization can point to concrete ways in which their programmatic activities have been harmed by an infringement on the right to information on the environmental effects of government actions created by NEPA.
103
In the case at hand, the plaintiffs argued that they suffered injury to their information dissemination activities due to the defendants' failure to address the effects of various federal actions on global warming under NEPA. The 104 plaintiffs further argued that they were harmed in disseminating information to the public because of the defendants' failure to consider the effects of such federal actions.
105
The court began by criticizing the informational standing doctrine, in part by noting that it goes against the U.S. Supreme Court's holding that a plaintiff needs to have more than a mere interest in a problem to confer standing. 106 Further, the court stated that Plaintiffs' claim of informational injury is "virtually indistinguishable from an ideological interest in the problem of global warming that, without more, is insufficient to confer standing." In so 107 stating, the court essentially held that an informational injury does not qualify as an environmental consequence of an agency's failure to comply with NEPA and therefore, it is not a distinct and palpable injury for standing purposes. 108 After finding that the plaintiffs lacked standing, the court denied the plaintiffs' motion to amend their compliant. The court was not persuaded 109 by the plaintiffs' collective reliance on one of the individual plaintiff's in the case by the name of Rifkin. While the court agreed that an injury to an individual's recreational use or aesthetic enjoyment of the environment will confer standing under NEPA, the court held that Rifkin must show that he has a direct stake in the outcome of the forty-two federal actions challenged in order to invoke the power of the court to review them under NEPA. The on the proper management of 24 million acres of federal land in Washington, Oregon, and northern California, which is home to the northern spotted owl.
117
In addition to raising concerns specifically directed at protecting the owl, plaintiffs also raised issues involving climate change. However, the court 118 expressly held the Forest Service EIS ("FSEIS") adequately considered the impacts of timber harvest on water quality, air quality, and climate change. Further, the petitioners claimed that the Business Plan EIS did not discuss global warming implications. The petitioners alleged that NEPA required such an assessment because the Market Driven plan would result in increased direct service industries operations, which would in turn lead to an increase in the effects of greenhouse gases. The Business Plan EIS was also alleged to have failed to discuss trans-boundary impacts of continued Canadian gas exploration. As with the other eight reasons, the court found that the 131 concerns raised by the petitioners were insufficient to hold the EIS inadequate. With respect to the climate change concern in particular, the 132 court found the EIS did examine the environmental impact to increased direct 2 service industries operations including CO output. The threshold issue in the case was whether the power plants were within the scope of the NEPA review. The court found that the plants were not 135 "projects" subject to U.S. jurisdiction because they are located outside of the U.S. However, the court said the Mexican power plants might still Since there were different factual circumstances to be considered for each permit, the court stated that it would consider the permits separately. The 140 court found that the BCP transmission line was a but-for cause of the generation of power at the EBC turbine and that the TDM plant was also an "effect" of the T-US transmission line because both the EBC turbine and the TDM plant existed primarily to supply electricity to these transmission lines. Therefore, the emissions resulting from the operation of the EBC 141 turbine are effects of the BCP line and must be analyzed under NEPA. The 142 court found, however, that the two turbines in the LRPC and the EAX turbine, which almost exclusively generated power for Mexico, were not causally linked to the BCP line and therefore their emissions did not have to be assessed under NEPA. 143 Next, the court decided whether the agencies acted arbitrarily when they issued a "Finding of No Significant Impact" as required by the APA's cause of action. First, the court held that the agencies did not act arbitrarily by not 144 considering whether emissions from the plants would violate the Clean Air Act. Second, the court found that the agencies did not act arbitrarily in 145 issuing the FONSIs because ozone pollution was uncertain and the court was not in a position to resolve disagreements among scientists as to methodology. Third, the agencies did not take the required "hard-look" at 146 the impacts of the proposed actions on the Salton Sea, an ecologically critical [Vol area. Fourth, the court found that DOE had not adequately responded to 147 comments concerning the water and air impacts of the power plants. Fifth, 148 the court found that the Mexican plants were not subject to local U.S. air pollution laws and the power plants need not be considered in the decisionmaking process.
Finally the court decided that the EA was inadequate as a matter of law because it did not disclose the significance of the plant emissions and those emissions had potential environmental impacts that were indicated in the record. For example, the EA underestimated the emissions from the TDM 149 2 plant and did not evaluate CO for global warming impacts or ammonia for public health impacts from these emissions. The court found that the EA 150 was also inadequate because it did not provide a range of reasonable and feasible alternatives. The analysis of alternatives is essential to an environmental analysis. The court stated, however, that the EA adequately considered the cumulative impact of the TDM and LRPC emissions. Neither 151 the EA or the FONSI discussed the action's cumulative impact on water quality and quantity in the New River or Salton Sea. Therefore, the court 152 found the whole cumulative analysis in the EA to be inadequate because it did not consider the combined impacts of future, specific power plants in the region, and the cumulative impact on water resources. noted, however, that while the extent of the effect was speculative, the nature of the effect of an increase in coal was not.
169
That is, the proposed project would increase the long-term demand for coal and with that would also increase adverse effects resulting from burning 2 coal, like CO emissions. Contrary to DM&E's assertion, the agency may 170 not simply ignore the likely effect of the increased burning of coal. The 171 CEQ regulations devise a specific procedure for evaluating reasonably foreseeable significant adverse effects on the human environment when there was incomplete or unavailable information. Therefore, the agency must 172 include this procedure in its EIS, and evaluate the effects that increased coal consumption will have on the environment before the project could be approved.
173
The court did find that the Board complied with § 106 of the NHPA. 174 The court found that all parties had an adequate opportunity to include public comments under NHPA and that the public was encouraged to comment on all aspects of the DEIS. In addition to challenging the adequacy of the FREA, the plaintiffs also argued that the defendants failed to consider, or inadequately considered: (1) significant new environmental impacts associated with a fundamental change in the phased construction of the project; (2) significant new air quality impacts; (3) significant new water quality impacts; (4) significant new impacts to rare, threatened, and endangered species; (5) significant new environmental justice impacts; (6) significant new noise impacts; and (7) significant new induced growth impacts.
186
In response, the court first deferred to the decision of the FHWA that phased construction would not result in significant impacts that had not been studied. From court found that while these specific studies were desirable, they were not required. Thus, NEPA had not been violated by the failure to conduct the 189 studies. 190 Similarly, the FWHA was determined to have taken a hard look at new information regarding water quality. Therefore, its decision that water 191 quality impacts were expected to be less than what was thought in 1986 was neither arbitrary nor capricious. The court found that this assessment was, 192 in turn, an adequate basis upon which to support its finding that no species in question would suffer a significant impact. The court determined that 193 FHWA also took a hard look at noise impacts in the FREA and its decision that an SIS was not required was not arbitrary or capricious.
194
The agency's finding, however, that no additional or new significant indirect or cumulative impacts were found to be arbitrary and capricious. 195 The agency engaged in no discussion related to the indirect impacts to agricultural lands, induced growth, or other cumulative impacts. As a result, 196 the court held that the environmental documentation for the project was legally inadequate. The defendants contended that the plaintiff lacked standing because the injuries alleged were insufficient. The defendants argued that the plaintiff 201 could not show an injury-in-fact, causation, or redressability. However, the 202 court disagreed and found that the plaintiffs only needed to show that it is reasonably probable that the challenged action will threaten their concrete interests.
203
In response to the claim that there was no injury-in-fact, the plaintiffs argued that it was undeniable that the projects would have significant consequences. Even though the defendants contested the credibility of the 204 plaintiff's evidence, the court determined that the plaintiff's evidence was sufficient to demonstrate a reasonable probability that emissions from defendants' projects will threaten the plaintiff's concrete interests. The Ex-Im and OPIC both stated that these projects would not have proceeded without their support and participation. Therefore, summary judgment on 208 the issues of injury-in-fact and causation was inappropriate.
209
The plaintiffs were also found to have met the redressability requirement for standing. Neither OPIC nor Ex-Im conducted environment assessments 210 under NEPA. As a result, the court found that the plaintiff's had shown 211 redressability because they demonstrated that the defendants' decisions could be influenced by further environmental studies. Thus, the court, by 212 compelling the defendants to conduct the assessments required by NEPA, could provide sufficient redress for the plaintiffs alleged injuries. Having disposed of the plaintiff's alleged lack of standing, the court next turned to the defendants' claim that there was no final agency action. The defendants' argued that the plaintiffs were not challenging a final agency action and instead were making a broad programmatic challenge. However 214 the court found that the plaintiffs' challenges were not overly broad or programmatic because OPIC's organic statute did not preclude judicial review. The statute is silent as to judicial review and the defendants failed 215 to clearly demonstrate that Congress intended to preclude this type of judicial inquiry. 216 Finally, the court held that the environmental procedures under OPIC's statute did not displace NEPA. The defendants pointed to Ninth Circuit case 217 law that precluded NEPA review in some instances. However, the court 218 noted that the record did not evince Congressional intent preclude NEPA.
219
As a result, the court denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment. Following STB's approval, the court reversed the STB's approval for its failure to comply with NEPA. The court remanded the case back to the 226 Board for it to reconsider its decision on two issues; (1) to stop short of imposing mitigating conditions of horn noise and (2) to consider expected effects of increased coal consumption. On remand the STB issued both a 227 supplemental environmental impact statement ("DSEIS") and a final supplemental environmental impact statement ("FSEIS"). STB subsequently approved the project. 228 Appellants, the Mayo Foundation, City of Rochester, and Olmstead County then argued that DM&E's acquisition of I&M Rail Link ("IMRL") constituted "significant new circumstances" and should have been considered as an alternative route for purposes of the NEPA analysis. The court found 229 that the STB's prior decisions, which found that the IMRL was not a reasonable alternative to the DM&E's route through Rodchester, thoroughly explained its conclusion for it not investigating the IMRL as an alternative route. Therefore, the STB was not required to consider the environmental 230 impacts of IMRL and the STB's decision was not arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.
231
Appellants Rochester and Olmstead County argued that STB should have required DM&E to fund measures for the establishment of quiet zones in Rochester, to build sound walls, and to install noise insulation at places subject to adverse levels of horn noise. On remand, the STB again did not 232 impose horn noise mitigation other than requiring DM&E liaisons to assist in the establishment of quiet zones. The court found that STB sufficiently 233 addressed this matter on remand when it adopted the rationale in its FSEIS, which showed that there were no instances where a railroad was required to fund a quiet zone or other horn noise abatement program. 234 Appellant Sierra Club argued that the STB had not adequately addressed the expected increase in consumption of PRB coal, and the corresponding increase in emissions from that coal, which would likely result due to the availability of a shorter and cheaper distribution route. Therefore, the Sierra 235 Club argued, the STB did not handle this issue correctly on remand. This 236 aspect of the case had been remanded by the circuit court because it had found the STB wrong in arguing that such effects were too speculative given the CEQ regulations for evaluating reasonably foreseeable significant adverse effects on the human environment. The court also remanded the case back 237 in order for the Board to consider the effects of other pollutants, including 2 nitrous oxide, CO , particulates, and mercury. 238 On remand, the STB used the Energy Information Administration's National Energy Modeling System (NEMS). Using NEMS, the STB 239 concluded that increases in such emissions would be less than one percent.
240
The court rejected the Sierra Club's argument and said that the STB extensively discussed the potential impacts on air quality that may result from the project's implementation on remand. Further, the court stated that the 241 STB adequately considered the reasonably foreseeable significant adverse effects of increased coal consumption. As a result, the court affirmed the 242 Board's decision. Act (OCSLA), the Endangered Species Act ("ESA"), and NEPA. 247 248 249
Petitioner's NEPA claims centered around two issues: (1) the leasing program violated OCSLA and NEPA because DOI failed to take the effects of climate change into consideration; (2) the leasing program violated OCSLA and NEPA because DOI failed to conduct a sufficient biological baseline on the seas. The court addressed the NEPA claims by first looking at the justiciability of the petitioners' climate change and baseline data claims under NEPA. Greenpeace, and others, sued the Overseas Private Investment Corporation ("OPIC") and the Export-Import Bank of the U.S. ("Ex-Im") under the APA and NEPA for projects that these agencies funded which emitted GHGs. The plaintiffs asserted that the defendants needed to conduct an environmental review under NEPA before they provided funding for such projects. Further, [Vol the plaintiffs argued that the defendants must take a "hard look" at the GHG emissions from these projects. Those project included: (1) Chad-Cameroon Both OPIC and Ex-Im had developed climate change reports, which concluded that their projects were not significant contributors to climate change.
The plaintiffs argued that both agencies had supported and 259 continued to provide financial assistance to international fossil fuel projects that emit GHGs. Plaintiffs claimed that these GHG emissions did have a 260 significant effect on the domestic environment. The plaintiffs filed motions 261 for summary judgment and the defendants filed cross-motions for the same.
262
Preliminarily, the plaintiffs argued that the projects were major federal actions subject to NEPA because of the amount of financing provided and because of the environmental guidelines imposed in connection with that financing. As the court noted, significant federal funding can transform a 263 state or local project into a major federal action. To determine if a project 264 qualifies as a major federal action under NEPA, both the nature of the federal funds used and the extent of federal involvement must be assessed. 265 To this end, the court then analyzed the scale of the defendants' projects, the amounts of their loan guaranties, and the percentage of the projects' total cost that came from the loans. Additionally, the court looked at the nature 266 of the defendants' involvement and whether they imposed conditions along with their financing. If the defendants' amount of financing did not 267 influence the scope of the project, the defendants did not possess sufficient control or the responsibility necessary to make these projects major federal actions. The court held that the information in the record was insufficient 268 to establish whether the defendants possessed the necessary control over the decision-making process. The plaintiffs had failed to show that any of the 269 projects qualified as major federal actions. However, the defendants failed 270 to prove that their projects did not qualify as major federal actions. 271 Therefore, the court denied both parties' motions for summary judgment. 272 The plaintiffs argued that collectively the defendants have supported 162 other fossil fuel fired power plants around the world that were not identified in the second amended complaint. The defendants countered that the 273 plaintiffs failed to sufficiently identify these other projects. The court held 274 that the plaintiffs failed to provide sufficient information about the total costs of these projects or the level of control and responsibility the defendants had over these projects.
275
Having determined that the plaintiffs failed to prove any of the undertakings to be major federal projects subject to NEPA with sufficient certainty to warrant summary judgment, the court readily disposed of the plaintiffs' remaining claims. The plaintiffs had argued that since the seven projects identified in their compliant represented actions that were "cumulative," the defendants should have prepared a single EIS under NEPA. Given that since that the court could not determine whether the 276 individual projects in the complaint qualified as major federal actions, the court found that it could not decide whether any of these actions would qualify as cumulative actions for purposes of summary judgment. However, the 277 court did note that the Ninth Circuit has generally found that a single EIS for cumulative actions is required when there is a geographical or temporal nexus among the actions or when an agency may have divided a project into multiple actions. 278 Finally, the court held that the plaintiffs are not entitled to an injunction directing the defendants to prepare an EA or an EIS for each and every fossil fuel project they may approve in the future. Slope Borough ("NSB") and the Alaska Eskimo Whaling Commission ("AEWC") filed a motion for a preliminary injunction to enjoin the sale by the United States of certain oil and gas leases located in the Beaufort Sea. That sale was approved the Minerals Management Service ("MMS") and the Department of Interior. The plaintiffs argued that MMS's decision not to supplement a 2003 environmental impact statement ("EIS") was arbitrary and capricious, and therefore violated NEPA.
282
The plaintiffs argued that higher oil prices, the cumulative impact of climate change, and increased industry interest in the Beaufort Sea and polar bears were new circumstances that required a SEIS. Further, plaintiffs 283 argued that if a lease sale were to be permitted, plaintiffs' subsistence activities would suffer irreparable harm from the effect of seismic testing on whales, waterfowl, seals, and caribou. Plaintiffs argued that the public 284 interest in ensuring that federal agencies comply with federal environmental laws overrides possible economic harm, which could result from temporarily enjoining the sale. 285 The defendants countered that that MMS was not required to prepare a SEIS because the 2003 EIS was based on generous development scenarios and a lease sale did not present a materially different assessment of environmental impact from what was stated in the 2003 EIS. Further, defendants argued 286 that any injury is only speculative and the public interest would be harmed by enjoining the sale.
287
The court denied the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction because it determined that MMS's FONNSI was not arbitrary and capricious and the Agency did take a hard look at the plaintiffs' concerns prior to issuing this that the plaintiffs would unlikely win this motion because while NEPA requires agencies to take into account all environmental considerations, it does not require that they should elevate environmental concerns over others.
290
The court found that most of the plaintiffs' concerns were considered in various scenarios of the 2003 EIS and therefore were not new or unanticipated developments. Given the Outer Continental Shelf Leasing Act ("OCLSA"), 291 the Marine Mammal Protection Act and its regulations, significant harm would unlikely result from the sale. The court gave deference to the agency's expertise and experience and found that the balance of hardships weighs in favor of the defendants who invested time and money in preparing for the lease sales. Further, the court held that if it issued an injunction, it would be 292 relying on mere speculation. The plaintiff's climate change arguments centered on the Federal-Aid Highways Act ("FAHA") and NEPA. They claim that the FHWA violated 300 FAHA by failing to make a determination that the proposed ICC was in the best overall public interest.
301
Plaintiffs contended that the defendants did not consider climate change and air pollution impacts. However, the court found that the defendants did 302 consider these impacts. For instance, the defendants found that there would be no new violations of the National Ambient Air Quality Standards as a result of the ICC. As a result, the court held that the defendants had 303 adequately considered these potential adverse effects. Moreover, the court 304 found that in response to comments, the FHWA explained that the "issue of global climate change is an important national and global concern that is being addressed in several ways by the Federal government." The record showed 305 that the response went on to say that the agency believed it was not useful to "consider greenhouse gas emissions as part of the project-level planning and development process," since there are "no national regulatory thresholds for greenhouse gas emissions or concentrations that have been established through law or regulation." 306 The court concluded that the defendants did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in concluding that no particular mitigation is needed here for the supposed impacts of a single stretch of highway on the global problem of climate change. Consequently, the court found that the defendants followed 307 the mandates of NEPA and the section 109(h) regulations in considering the environmental effects and alternatives. The court also held that the 308 defendants acted according to NEPA in its conclusion that the ICC project is in the "best overall public interest." NEPA. In their first climate change challenge, the appellants' contended that the rule was arbitrary and capricious and contrary to EPCRA because its calculation of the costs and benefits of alternative fuel economy standards 2 assigns zero value to the benefit of CO emissions reductions.
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The court found that the NHTSA's failure to monetize benefits of GHG emissions reductions was arbitrary and capricious for several reasons. First, 314 the record showed that there is a range of values where mitigating climate change emissions have an estimated positive benefit and the value of carbon emissions reductions is not zero. Second, NHTSA gave no reason for why 315 it believed the range of values presented to it was "extremely wide." Third,
316
NHTSA's reasoning is arbitrary and capricious because it has monetized other uncertain benefits, such as the reduction of criteria pollutants, crash, noise, and congestion costs, and the value of increased energy security. Finally, 317 NHTSA's conclusion that commenters did not reliably demonstrate that monetizing the value of carbon reduction would have affected the stringency of the CAFE standard is contrary to the record. The Court found that 318 NHTSA's decision not to monetize the benefit of carbon emissions reduction was arbitrary and capricious, and remanded to NHTSA for it to include a monetized value for this benefit in its analysis of the proper CAFE standards. 319 Appellants also argued that NHTSA's Environmental Assessment is inadequate under NEPA because it does not take a "hard look" at the GHG NHTSA clearly has statutory authority to impose or enforce fuel economy standards under the EPCA, and it could have exercised its discretion in setting higher standards if an EIS contained evidence that so warranted. The CAFE 321 standard will affect the level of the nation's greenhouse gas emissions and impact global warming. As a result, the EPCA does not limit NHTSA's duty under NEPA to assess the environmental impacts, including the impact on climate change. EPCA's goal of energy conservation and NEPA's goals to protect, restore, and enhance the environment are complementary.
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The court next examined the EA to determine whether it had adequately considered the possible consequences of the proposed agency action when concluding that the action will have no significant impact on the environment. The court also addressed whether NHTSA's determination that no EIS is required is a reasonable conclusion. The court found that the EA's climate change is precisely the kind of cumulative impacts analysis that NEPA requires agencies to conduct. 327 The court concluded that NHTSA's FONSI was arbitrary and capricious. Therefore, the court found that the agency must prepare an EIS and Department of the Interior Secretarial Order 3226, which directs the Bureau of Land Management ("BLM") to consider and analyze potential climate change impacts when making decisions about public lands. According to the complaint, the BLM did not follow the directive of the order when it approved certain oil and gas leases. The complaint further alleged that the planning and decision making process for the lease sales failed to address GHG emissions by quantifying and reducing methane and other emissions.
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On March 12, 2010, the parties settled the lawsuit and the BLM agreed to suspend certain oil and gas leases, which would allow the BLM to conduct further review of the leases under NEPA. Such review will, in accordance with the CEQ regulations integrate other environmental review procedures to the extent required by other federal statutes, regulations, and agency policies and procedures including FLPMA, MLA, and Secretarial Order 3226. As a result of this settlement, BLM must, for the first time, conduct climate change reviews along with other environmental assessments required by federal law.
V. CASE LAW ANALYSIS
A. Climate Change is within the Purview of NEPA
The primary commonality throughout all of the cases is that effects from various projects on climate change do fit within the rubric of NEPA. As the court in City of Los Angeles v. NHTSA stated, the new and potentially catastrophic environmental phenomenon presented by global warming fits squarely within the broad framework of NEPA. In addition, the court in that 338 case took note of the precautionary aspects under NEPA. That is, the legislative intent behind NEPA is to anticipate and predict the environmental effects of a proposed action before it takes place. Moreover, the court 339 specifically found that while the timing and scope of injuries from global warming are uncertain, it is worse not to evaluate its possible consequences in an EIS.
As a result, climate change is considered "reasonably 340 foreseeable" and should be taken into account in the review of any applicable federal proposal. found that the net effect of human activities since 1750 has been one of warming. Moreover, as both the IPCC and EPA note in their reports, this warming is expected to result in widespread adverse environmental effects.
361
The courts have effectively adopted a posture that these direct and indirect effects must be examined. 
C. Cumulative Impacts Must Be Assessed
Under the NEPA regulations promulgated by CEQ, "cumulative impact" is defined "as the impact on the environment which results from the incremental impact of the action when added to other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions regardless of what agency or person undertakes such other actions." The regulations further provide that 366 "cumulative impacts can result from individually minor but collectively significant actions taking place over a period of time." This definition 367 accurately describes human-induced climate change, which is nothing more than a series of human activities that have resulted in higher temperatures and corresponding ecological affects. Moreover, the courts also view a cumulative impact analysis as a necessary component of any NEPA review related to climate change.
In Center for Biological Diversity v. NHTSA, the plaintiffs argued that the NHTSA did not take a "hard look" at the GHG implications of it CAFE standards rulemaking and did not examine the rule's cumulative impact. The 368 court held that the EA's cumulative impact analysis was inadequate. In 369 particular, the court noted that even though climate change is a global issue, this does not release an agency from its duty to assess the effects of its actions on global warming. The cumulative impact regulation requires such an 370 assessment. Moreover, the court noted that the impact of GHG emissions on climate change is precisely the kind of cumulative impact analysis that NEPA requires agencies to conduct. include an evaluation of CO emissions from these projects and did not consider the combined impacts of future power plants in the region.
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D. The Role of Uncertainty
As previously noted, NEPA is one of the best national examples of precautionary action, since it stresses forethought and attention to consequences. Moreover, its regulations anticipate that there may be data gaps in decision making and evaluating reasonably foreseeable significant adverse effects on the human environment. NEPA requires "the agency shall always make clear that such information is lacking." Furthermore, "reasonably 374 foreseeable" adverse effects include "impacts which have catastrophic consequences, even if their probability of occurrence is low, provided that the analysis of the impacts is supported by credible scientific evidence, is not based on pure conjecture, and is within the rule of reason." For instance, finds that it is very likely that over the past fifty years cold days, cold nights and frosts have become less frequent over most land areas, and hot days and hot nights have become more frequent, the report only found that it is likely 377 that heat waves have become more frequent over most land areas. This 378 means that in the case of the former finding there is a greater than 90 percent probability of occurrence, while in the case of the latter finding there is a greater than 66 percent probability of occurrence. This is the type of 379 uncertainty that the NEPA regulations expect will be built into any analysis. Moreover, the courts have conclusively held that even uncertain effects must be analyzed under NEPA.
For example, in determining whether the plaintiffs had standing under the causation element in City of Los Angeles v. NHTSA, the court noted that to obtain standing, a plaintiff only needs to show that the alleged injury is fairly traceable to the proposed action. To require a high level of certainty is 380 wrong, since the legislative intent of NEPA is to anticipate and predict the environmental effects of a proposed action before it takes place. For 381 instance, in Mid States Coalition for Progress v. Surface Transportation Board, the court rebuffed the defendant's suggestion that increased coal-use would result because of the proposed rail project was speculative, and found that the effects of increased coal-use related to climate change was not speculative. Moreover, the court noted that the agency could not ignore such 382 an effect and the CEQ regulations devised a specific procedure for evaluating reasonably foreseeable significant adverse effects on the human environment when there was incomplete or unavailable information. 383 
VI. CEQ DRAFT GUIDANCE ON ASSESSING GHG IMPACTS FROM PROPOSED FEDERAL ACTIONS
With the ever-increasing importance of assessing GHG impacts from proposed federal actions, and a growing body of case law relative to that assessing, CEQ developed a guidance document entitled "Draft NEPA Guidance on Consideration of the Effects of Climate Change and Greenhouse Gas Emissions." The draft guidance's purpose is to assist in explaining how 384 federal agencies should analyze the environmental effects of a proposed agency action under § 102 of NEPA and the relevant CEQ regulations. The guidance provides that "if a proposed action would be reasonably anticipated 2 to cause direct emissions of 25,000 metric tons or more of CO -equivalent GHG emissions on an annual basis, agencies should consider this an indicator that a quantitative and qualitative assessment may be meaningful to decision makers and the public." However, the guidance is not proposed to be 385 applicable to federal land and resources management decisions. Examples 386 of proposed projects that could potentially fall within the scope of this guidance include approval of a large solid waste landfill, coal-fired power plants, or a methane venting coal mine. among the measures and alternatives to be considered are enhanced energy efficiency, lower GHG-emitting technology, renewable energy, planning for carbon capture and sequestration, and capturing or beneficially using fugitive methane emissions.
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It is through the scoping process that agencies should determine the appropriate emphasis that should be placed on climate change considerations.
Agencies should consider things like the sensitivity, 391 location, and time frame of the proposed action in determining that emphasis. Any analysis that emphasizes climate change considerations should consider effects on the environment, public health and safety, and vulnerable populations who are more likely to be adversely effected by climate change.
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Moreover, "[a]gencies should consider the specific effects of the proposed action . . . , the nexus of those effects with projected climate change effects on the same aspects of our environment, and the implications for the environment to adapt to the projected effects of climate change."
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One example given is an industrial process that may draw water from a reduced stream caused by decreased snow pack or significant heat that is exposed to increasing atmospheric temperatures. Another illustration is a 394 proposal that would draw copious amounts of water, which would be required a discussion on changes in water availability associated with climate change. In the analysis of any proposed action, agencies should rely on 395 NEPA's "rule of reason" to govern the detail in any environmental effects analysis related to climate change. As indicated, there is a robust body of case law that deals with climate change within the context of NEPA. Federal courts recognize that climate change impacts can be addressed in NEPA litigation. Failure to address these impacts at that initial stage of litigation will almost certainly result in a legal challenge. Consequently, all parties to any NEPA action-federal agencies, industry, environmental groups, and the public-at-large-should ensure that climate change impacts are addressed during the scoping process. Moreover, interested parties should ensure that any concerns they have related to climate impacts should be submitted during the public comment process or risk failure to establish standing to challenge an agency decision.
Potential litigants should also use this body of case law as a means to apply and interpret the NEPA regulations to any proposed federal action. For instance, the court in Center for Biological Diversity v. NHTSA held that the EA's cumulative impact analysis was inadequate. The court noted that even 407 though climate change is a global issue, this does not release an agency from its duty to assess the effects of its actions on global warming. The 408 cumulative impact regulation requires such an assessment.
However, the most important development in NEPA litigation is the CEQ's promulgation of its draft guidance relative to assessing GHG impacts from proposed federal actions. This guidance, while still in draft form, provides all parties with a written explanation on how federal agencies should analyze climate change impacts under NEPA and the CEQ regulations. The expectation is that failure to follow this draft guidance may result in a legal challenge. It will be interesting to see if and how courts will apply to guidance to climate change challenges under NEPA. 409 . City of Los Angeles, 912 F.2d at 478.
IX. CONCLUSION
In many respects, the statutory structure of NEPA makes it an ideal planning tool for projects that might impact climate. Unlike the single medium statutes, NEPA applies to all federal actions and agencies. Moreover, this approach is systematic and interdisciplinary in its in planning and decisionmaking. As the court in City of Los Angeles v. NHTSA stated, global warming is a "new and potentially catastrophic environmental phenomenon that fits squarely into the broad NEPA framework." Consequently, the 409 development of GHG guidance by the CEQ to use NEPA in a consistent manner to address climate change concerns in federal planning is a welcome sign that NEPA will remain a relevant tool to combat climate change.
